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CASE NOTES

regulating the order of challenges to a juror.8 0 Where such a statute is
in effect, it is mandatory; the court exercises its discretion only in the
absence of statutory regulation.8 '
The Nail case has expressly reversed a long line of Arkansas decisions
regarding the right to peremptorily challenge an accepted juror, and
appears to be in definite conflict with the view in most states that it is
error to allow such a challenge when the defendant has exhausted his
peremptory challenges.
The order in which peremptory challenges are exercised is more important than it seems. Assume a particular juror is so offensive that both
sides would not hesitate to peremptorily challenge him. If the state must
challenge first, the defendant has saved himself a challenge. Repeat this
for a number of jurors, and we see that the order in which the challenges
must be exercised has its advantages and disadvantages. Further, where
the peremptory challenges are exhausted on one side, to allow such a
challenge by the opposite side after he has accepted the juror could conceivably work a hardship, if not injustice, on that party.
It will be interesting to note if the Nail majority opinion will have any
effect on the discretionary powers of the trial courts in states where the
order of challenges is not mandatory by statute. The possible effect will
be even more important in cases where the defendant has exhausted his
peremptory challenges and the court will be faced with precisely the
same problem.
30 Ark. Stat. (1947)

c.19, S43-1914 provides: "When challenges taken.-It must be

taken before he is sworn in chief, but the court, for a good cause, may permit it to
be made at any time before the jury is completed." (emphasis supplied). Ark. Stat.
(1947) c.19, § 43-1924 provides: "Order of challenges.-The challenge to the juror
shall first be made by the State and then by the defendant, and the State must exhaust
her challenges to each particular juror before such juror is passed to the defendant
for challenge or acceptance."
81 State v. Ferguson, 187 La. 869, 175 So. 603 (1937); People v. Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48,

193 N.E. 634 (1934) cites similar statute in N.Y. Code, Crim. Proc. §385 which provides: "Challenges to an individual juror must be taken first by the people, then by
the defendant." Accord: People v. Hamlin, 192 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1959).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-MASSACHUSETTS JOINS STATES
HOLDING BLOOD GROUPING TESTS CONCLUSIVE
IN PATERNITY SUITS
In a criminal proceeding on complaint charging the defendant with
begetting complainant with child, evidence was introduced showing that
the defendant had intercourse with complainant during the probable
period of conception and that the defendant had suggested a name for
the child. A blood grouping test was made. The test excluded the de-
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fendant as the father of the child. The commonwealth conceded that
the tests were properly made by a qualified expert. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts reversed the district court's finding of guilty on
the basis that where a properly administered blood test excludes the
defendant as the father, the defendant is entitled to a finding in his favor
as a matter of law. Commonwealtb v. D'Avella, 162 N.E.2d 19 (Mass.,
1959).

1

The blood groups are simply inherited and known with certainty at
birth or soon thereafter. They retain their character throughout life,
unchanged by climate, disease, age or by any other environmental or
genetical agency. Regardless of the time between blood grouping tests
or which expert performs the tests the results are the same. They are
objective.

2

Because of the scientific certainty of blood tests most of the states
either by judicial decision3 or by statute 4 allow the results of the tests
to be admitted into evidence in actions concerning illegitimate children
when they exclude the possibility of paternity. But in admitting the test
' The scope of this discussion is limited to the conclusiveness of the results of the
blood tests when they exclude the possibility of paternity in actions concerning illegitimate children. It is not concerned with the tests when they support a finding of

paternity.
2Race and Sangers, Blood Groups in Man, p. 310 (2d ed., 1954).

8 The following jurisdictions by judicial decision admit the results of the blood tests
to exclude paternity: District of Columbia, Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (C.A. D.C.,
1940); Iowa, Livermore v. Livermore, 233 Iowa 1155, 11 N.W.2d 389 (1943); New
York, U.S. v. Shaughnessy, 115 F.Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y., 1953); Oklahoma, Roberts v.
Van Cleave, 205 Okla. 319, 237 P.2d 892 (1951); South Dakota, State v. Damm, 64
S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936); Vermont, Pomainville v. Bicknell, 118 Vt. 328, 109
A.2d 342 (1954). But Louisiana, in Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So.2d 707 (1956),
held that the tests were not admissible. The court held they would not be admissible
until the legislature passed a statute making them admissible.
4The following states have statutes making the exclusionary test results admissible

and conclusive: California, West's Ann. Cal. Codes, Code Civil Proc. §§ 1980.1 to 1980.7
(Supp., 1959); Illinois, 111. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 106J, §§ 1 to 7; Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann.
S25.474 (Supp., 1954); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., c. 522, §§ 1 to 10 (Supp.,
1957); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. (1959) S 109.258; Utah, Utah Code Ann. (1959) c. 78,
§§ 25-18 to 25-23; Wisconsin, Wests Wis. Stat. Ann. §325.23 (1959 Supp.). The following states have statutes making the exclusionary test results admissible. They are
silent as to the weight to be given the test results: Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann., c. 34
§§ 705.1 to 705.3 (1960 Supp.); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat., c. 52, §§ 1 to 7 (1957 Supp.);
Indiana, Burns Indiana Statutes, c. 33, §658 (1959 Supp.); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat., c. 166,
§ 34 (1959 Supp.); Maryland, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 12, § 20 (1959 Supp.); Massachusetts,
Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 273, § 12A (1959 Supp.); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat., §56.010 (1959);
New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann., c. 2A, §§ 83-2 to 83-3 (1959 Supp.); New York, McKinney
Consol. Laws of N.Y. Ann., Dom. Rel. § 126-A (1959 Supp.); Pennsylvania, Purdon's
Pa. Stat. Ann., c. 28, S 306 (1958 Supp.); West Virginia, W.Va. Code, c. 58, § 4776(1)
(8) (1959 Supp).
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results, the majority of the states have left the question of how much
weight will be given this evidence unanswered.
Historically, the question of paternity has been a question for the trier
of facts. This was left undisturbed in the initial rulings of the American
courts of last resort. The Supreme Court of California, in Arais v.
Kalensnikoif,5 was the first high court to consider whether the results
of the blood test were conclusive if they established non-paternity. This
court held that the blood tests were not conclusive on the issue of nonpaternity. In reaching this decision it was reasoned that where there is
a conflict between scientific testimony and the testimony as to facts, the
trial court or jury has the duty to determine the relative weight of the
evidence. As a result of this line of reasoning juries frequently seemed
to apply their subjective rules of thumb in determining the paternity of
the child: If the alleged father can adequately support the child he is the
father;7 if the alleged father and the mother are married it is better to
compel the husband to support the child of another man's adulterous relations with the husband's wife than to bastardize that child; 8 and the
witticism of the negotiable instruments law, that when the maker cannot
be found the last known subsequent endorser is held liable, is applied.
The unfortunate consequences of the Arais case were demonstrated
nine years later in the highly publicized case of Berry v. Chaplin.9 A California appellate court, conceding that the testimony of the complainant
was in part "unique" and "extraordinary,"' 0 that the blood tests excluded
5 10 Cal.2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937).
6 In Commonwealth v. Zammailli, 17 Pa. Dist. & Co. 229 (1931), the court granted
a new trial because the jury's verdict in finding contrary to the results of an unchallenged blood test was against the weight of the evidence. In Spencer v. Spencer, 53
Dolph Co. Ct. (Pa.) 241 (1942) the court held that the blood test was conclusive. These
were lower court cases.
7E.g., Berry v. Chaplin, 74 CalApp.2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946). Although Miss
Berry's testimony was unique and extraordinary as to her relations with other men,
and the blood tests showed Chaplin could not be the father, the jury found that
Chaplin, a wealthy man, was the father.
8
E.g., Hill v. Johnson, 102 Cal.App.2d 94, 226 P.2d 655 (1951). Plaintiff testified that
the defendant and not her husband was the father of her child. The blood tests
excluded the husband but not the defendant. The jury found against the defendant
but, on appeal, the court reversed on the grounds that the blood tests were not conclusive and that the presumption of legitimacy, when the husband has access to his wife,,
was conclusive. See Prochnow v. Prochnow, 274 Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278 (1957).
9 74 Cal.App.2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946).
10 Ibid., at 450. The defendant argued that the particular sexual relation in which
the child was to have been conceived as described by the plaintiff was unbelievable..
The court said: "Quaint though the episode may appear, the jury presumably composed of experienced persons, must have believed her statements, and merely because
the incident as described may have been unique and extraordinary an appellate court.
will not say that her testimony is incredible."
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the putative father, and that the scientific law of blood groupings is unquestioned, nevertheless ruled it could not upset the jury's finding for
complainant because of the California Supreme Court's decision in the
Arais case.
Jordan v. Davis" presented the question of the conclusiveness of the
blood tests to the Supreme Court of Maine. The court stated that the
tests were not conclusive on the issue of non-paternity as a matter of
law. This was based on the reasoning that the jury may find that there
has been some error in the handling of the blood or serum or some
mistake in the conclusions reached.
Vermont in Pomainville v. Bicknel112 followed the reasoning in the
Davis case but the court emphasized the fact that the person who made
the tests was not called as a witness to testify as to the manner in which
the tests were conducted.
The New York, 13 New Jersey, 14 New Hampshire,'" Ohio,' 6 Pennsylvania 17 and Wisconsin 8 courts followed the Arais decision and held that
the results of the blood grouping tests were not conclusive. The statutes
of these states made the results of the blood tests admissible in evidence,
but they were silent as to the weight to be given this evidence. The
courts viewed this to mean the tests were not intended to be conclusive.
Secondly, the courts felt the tests might not be properly made. Hence
the conflict between scientific testimony and testimony of the facts was
left to be decided by the trier of the facts.
In Williams v. Williams19 the Louisiana court ruled that the tests were
not even admissible. It felt that the admissibility and the weight of the
blood tests was for the legislature to decide.
Because the juries were in many cases apparently ignoring the results
of the blood tests, the courts adopting the view that the exclusionary
results of the blood tests are conclusive are growing in number. This
trend started with Jordan v. Mace20 in 1949. One year after its decision
11 143 Me. 185, 57 A.2d 209 (1948).
12 118 Vt. 330, 109 A.2d 342 (1954).
18Harding v. Harding, 22 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1940) affirmed without opinion in 261
App. Div. 924, 25 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1941).
14 Ross v. Marx, 24 N.J. Super, 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952).
15 Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954).
16 State v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N.E.2d 773 (1944); State v. Holad, 63 Ohio
App. 16, 24 N.E.2d 962 (1939).
17 Commonwealth v. Wright, 178 Pa. Super. 181, 113 A.2d 724 (1955).
18 Prochnow v. Prochnow, 274 Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278 (1957).
19 230 La. 1, 87 So.2d 707 (1956).
20 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670, (1949). "If the jury found that the results of the blood
grouping tests were inaccurate, such finding must have been based on mere conjecture
or understandable sympathy for the complainant... . Such finding is not supported by
any believable evidence in the record." Ibid., at 673.
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in the Davis case, the Maine court was again faced with the weight to
be given the results of the blood tests. This time the Supreme Court held
that the Davis case was not authority for the proposition that the jury
can give as much weight as it may desire to biological laws, but that it
supports the proposition that the jury has a duty to determine if the
tests were properly made. If the evidence shows the tests were properly
made, the exclusion of the defendant as the father is conclusive.
The New York appellate court in Saks v. Saks2 1 held the tests were
not only admissible but conclusive. Several other lower courts also held
that the tests were conclusive but in Scalone v. Scalone22 the Supreme
Court of New York followed the Arais and Davis cases. The following
year the Supreme Court in C. v. C.23 reversed the ruling in the Scalone
case and held the tests were conclusive when they established non-paternity. Since this case, it is felt that New York is in line with the Maine
court in the Mace case.
In 1952 the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity was
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law and the American Bar Association. The preamble to the Act
states:
If the negative fact is established it is evident that there is a great miscarriage
of justice to permit juries to hold on the basis of oral testimony, passion or
sympathy, that the person charged is the father and24is responsible for the
support of the child and other incidents of paternity.
The Uniform Act makes the results of the blood grouping tests conclusive when they exclude the putative father as the father if the tests
are properly made.
In 1953 this Act was adopted in California,2 5 thereby superseding the
27
26
Arais, Chaplin and Johnson cases, in New Hampshire and in Oregon.
Two years later Illinois adopted the Act in part.2 8 The legislatures of

Utah 29 and Michigan ° also passed statutes making the results of the blood
tests conclusive when they establish non-paternity. The same year the
2171

N.Y.S.2d 797 (1947).

N.Y.S.2d 167 (1950).
109 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1951).
24 Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 9, p. 102.
25 West's Ann. Cal. Code, Code Civ. Proc. §§1980.1 to 1980.7 (1959 Supp.).
26 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., c.522, §§ 1 to 10 (1959 Supp.).
2298
23

27

Ore. Rev. Star. (1959) § 109.258.

28111.

Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 1061, §§ 1 to 7.

29 Utah Code Ann. (1959) c. 78, §§ 25-18 to 25-23.

30 Mich. Stat. Ann., § 25.474 (1954 Supp.).
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Wisconsin courts rendered their decision in Prochnow v. Prochnow3'
the legislature made the blood tests conclusive if they establish non82

paternity.

In the D'Avella case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court followed this
trend. The court reasoned that the legislature passed their statute admitting the results of the blood tests in evidence because the tests were
scientifically reliable. The court went on to say that to permit the jury
to ignore these tests, would defeat the intention of the legislature. Since
the results of the tests were not in dispute, it was decided, as a matter of
law, that the defendant was excluded as the father.
Chart I shows that over the past ten years the weight of the American
courts has shifted from the view that the results of the blood grouping
tests are not conclusive to the view that they are conclusive.83
Of the fifteen states which have decided the issue of conclusiveness of
the blood tests which establish non-paternity, all but five have held the
tests are conclusive. It should be noted that while Pennsylvania still holds
that the tests are not conclusive, in two 1959 decisions8 4 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has granted new trials because the findings of paternity
were against the weight of the evidence. In one of these cases all of the
evidence except the blood tests showed paternity.
Vermont is at the same stage that Maine was in 1948. Since in the Bicknell case the court did give considerable weight to the fact that the
method of making the tests was in doubt, as did the Maine court in the
31274 Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278 (1957). In this case the husband was in service and
his wife at home having an affair with another man. She later cohabited with her husband for one night. In the morning she told him she wanted a divorce. Eight months
later she had a fully developed child. The blood tests excluded the husband as possible
father. The jury found that the husband was the father. This decision was affirmed.
3

2 West's Wis. Stat. Ann., § 325.23 (1959 Supp.).

The following is a chronological list of the developments shown on the graph:
(1948) California, Maine, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania held not conclusive;
(1949) Maine conclusive by judicial decision; (1950) No change; (1951) New York
finally settled as conclusive by judicial decision; (1952) New Jersey held not conclusive; (1953) California, New Hampshire and Oregon, conclusive by statute; (1954)
Vermont held not conclusive, Michigan conclusive by statute; (1955) Utah, Illinois
conclusive by statute; (1956) Louisiana held not conclusive; (1957) Wisconsin made
conclusive by statute; (1958) No change; (1959) Massachusetts held conclusive by judicial decision.
In New Hampshire, the Groulx case was decided in 1954, one year after adopting the
Uniform Act on Blood Tests. The court pointed out that the trial was before passage
of the Act and hence it did not apply. In Wisconsin, the statute was passed the same
year as the Prochnow decision. Therefore, neither of these states appear on Chart I
as states holding tests not conclusive.
33

34 Commonwealth v. Coyle, 154 A.2d 412 (Pa., 1959); Commonwealth v. Gromo, 154
A.2d 417 (Pa., 1959). In both of these cases Justice Ervin dissented in part. He felt that
instead of granting a new trial the defendant should have been dismissed.
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CHART I
THE TREND TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF BLOOD GROUPING TESTS AS CONCLUSIVE
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YEARS - 1948- 1959
Davis case, it is probable that it will reverse itself when the question is
again presented if the test is shown to have been properly given.
At the time the New Jersey court ruled that the tests were not conclusive, only two states were of the opinion that the tests were conclusive.
In view of the acceptance of the tests in ten states as conclusive, it might
35
follow its earlier dicta in Cortese v. Cortese and hold the tests conclusive.
In Ohio the view that the blood tests are not conclusive is well settled,
as it was in California before 1953. It will probably take a statute to
change this court's stand.3 6
The Louisiana court, in the Williams case, took a definite stand that it
will not admit the tests into evidence until a statute admitting them is
passed. The court also took this view as to the conclusiveness of the
test results.
In the majority of American jurisdictions, the weight to be given the
35 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
36 But in State v. Gray, 145 N.E.2d 162 (Juv. Ct. Ohio, 1957), the court held that the
tests were conclusive when they establish non-paternity.
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test is still undecided. However, Maryland has indicated that it will follow
the Mace case and give conclusive weight to blood tests in paternity
cases. The court of appeals commented in Shanks v. State,3 7 that in
bastardy prosecutions: "[T]he non-scientific evidence is often quite un38
reliable and scientific evidence may be conclusive as to non-paternity.,
Similarly, there was dicta in Beach v. Beach 9 that the District of Columbia will make the tests conclusive. The rule also was recognized in United
4

States v. Shaughnessy.

0

In view of the stature of the states adopting the rule that the blood
tests are conclusive to establish non-paternity if properly made, it seems
to follow that the rest of the states likewise will follow this rule. But the
question remains, will these states wait for decisions like the Chaplin,
Johnson and Prochnow decisions before, either through their courts or
their legislature, they adopt this rule.
87 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945).
38 Ibid., at 449, 90.

39 114 F.2d 479 (C.A.D.C., 1940).
40 115 F.Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y., 1953).

EQUITY-RESTRICTIVE COVENANT ON CHATTEL
BINDING ON THIRD PARTY WITH NOTICE
Plaintiff, a dealer in damaged goods, agreed with a carrier not to permit
fruit salad which had become frozen in transit to enter retail outlets under
the original brand name label. The carrier notified the plaintiff that a
violation of their agreement would result in a severance of further
business relations with the carrier, one of its principal customers. The
plaintiff then resold the goods to a third party. Subsequently, the defendant, a former employee of the plaintiff, who had participated in the
transactions, purchased the goods from the third party and began their
sale under the original brand name label without regard to the sales restriction imposed by the plaintiff. In affirming the decree granting an
injunction, the court held that, having acquired the goods with the knowledge of the restriction on their resale in the containers with the original
label, defendant was bound thereby. Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 346 P.2d
505 (Cal. App., 1959).
Originally at common law, restraints on the alienation of property were
considered void.' Equitable servitudes on realty binding subsequent purchasers with notice of the restrictions were first upheld in Tulk v.MoxI Coke's Institutes, Vol. 2, p. 21 (1836).

